Introduction
What causes a state to increase aid flows in a given area at a given point in time? In this thesis, I theorize on the role of unintentional signaling caused by domestic crisis(es). For the purposes of this argument I examine one-sided violence as representative of domestic crisis, and so speculate on the potential reaction from the international community, as measured by official development aid flows. I will then perform a series of empirical tests in order to investigate whether a relationship does exist between one-sided violence and foreign aid.
As the body of research on conflict and civil unrest continues to grow, new conceptions of peace-seeking policy practices and extracurricular government activities have continued to emerge. However, a largely neglected area of study has been that of one-sided violence. Such events have typically been catalogued as side effects instead of being considered as intentional acts in war. Despite this perspective of understanding one-sided violence, the ideas set forth by Raphael Lemkin have slowly pushed forward (Lemkin 1944; Kalyvas 1990; Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay 2004) . In contrast to the former viewpoints, these researchers took on addressing one-sided violence in terms of other, potentially larger, unintended outcomes. In this paper I address one of those possible outcomes as an unintentional signaling event to the international community, indicating a state in need of aid or intervention. This means of communication is the fundamental chore of a signal.
Examining one-sided violence in the context of an unintended signal implies new avenues of research. A direct relationship has been observed between one-sided violence and conflict (Eck & Hultman 2007; Eck & Wallensteen 2004; Sundberg 2009) , and still many theories to be made from the understanding of that dynamic. Furthering this path of speculation, I investigate a new potential relationship: the connection between foreign aid and one-sided violence. The expectation of foreign aid inflows to "surge" following incidents of one-sided violence does not require any stretch of the imagination (Elbadawi, Kaltani & Schmidt-Hebbel 2008) . Such events may indicate a sudden increase of domestic strife to donor nations, and in turn those donors may be expected to respond with foreign aid as a salve for the recipient's troubles.
Foreign aid and conflict are not new subjects of analysis in international relations. The correlation has been examined from a myriad of theoretical foundations, with the relationship confirmed and confirmed again. The spectrum of study among foreign aid and conflict is broad. To offer direction for my theory, I examined the work of Svensson (1999) , who executed a game-theoretical assessment of the relationship between conflict and rent-seeking behaviors. His findings indicated that there exists a correlation between domestic rentseeking and increased foreign aid. In the theory for this thesis, donor self-interests are how donor states interpret the signal communicated by incidents of one-sided violence. Using ideas drawn from his research, I discuss international rent-seeking as a reaction to one-sided violence. In following chapters, I will expand upon this connection further.
These two concepts (foreign aid and one-sided violence) meet when the final component is included: recipient need. While there are many conflict-ridden areas across the globe, an exceptional event may be required to occur in order for potential donors to perceive the need of increased aid. To be clear: I do not assume humanitarian aims of such donations. In the underdeveloped regions of the world, ongoing conflicts are commonplace, and I do not argue that signaling need is inspiring humanitarian behaviors. Civil wars may go on for decades.
For example, see the case of the Colombian government, which has battled the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) since 1964 (Kruetz 2007) . In cases such as these, I argue that the choice of foreign aid donation would require a volatile triggering event: something that indicates a disruption of normal events leading to increased unrest, and thus a potential opportunity for rent-seeking. This is a connection that I will further expand upon later in this thesis.
Arguing that incidents of one-sided violence serve as a signal of a disruption in the recipient's domestic norm, I theorize that donor states will engage in rent-seeking behaviors in order to gain influence following incidents of one-sided violence. From this I test for a relationship between one-sided violence and foreign aid flows. Recent evidence shows that such rent-seeking behavior has been a continuing problem in developing nations, particularly during periods when a state finds itself economically flourishing (Svensson 1999) . My theory questions: if such events are common domestically, is it possible that there are paralleled behaviors at the international level? Using foreign aid as representative of a donor state's investment in their own self-interests, I further ask, if foreign aid, as the wide body of literature shows, is largely unsuccessful at realizing its goals of development and stability in an area, why then do these money streams continue?
In this paper I pose the following question: if the assumption of donor-state interests (and therefore lack of altruism) holds true, and so too does the evidence indicating the lack of (or limited) effectiveness of foreign aid (Easterly 2003; Martens 2005) what incentives do donor states have to give aid beyond humanitarian motives? I focus on one-sided violence as a triggering signal of opportunity, and expect that there will be a surge in foreign aid as the self-interested donors attempt to benefit from these cases. Ascribing the relationship between one-sided violence and foreign aid to this logical foundation, I empirically test the existence and stability of this relationship.
CHAPTER 2. OVERVIEW OF ONE-SIDED VIOLENCE
Why One-sided Violence?
Within the theory seen in Chapter 4, I outline the theoretical foundations that make up this thesis. However, in examining one-sided violence as a signal, it is necessary to understand that such events are not the only potential signals. Nor are they the only means for a state incurring crises to increase aid flows. While there may be many reasons for the relationship between one-sided violence and foreign aid, it is the relationship that I will measure, and not the signaling function. In this argument, one-sided violence was chosen as a variable based on its exceptional nature to the international community. These events are generally well known, and the armed versus unarmed dichotomy may be considered a prime example of circumstances signaling a need of external aid. For this reason, I chose to examine one-sided violence as a means of understanding the signaling nature of domestic unrest, when examining changes in aid flows.
Current Literature
Literature on the aggregate effects of one-sided violence is still in its infancy. Currently, a wealth of information exists concerning the solitary incidents of one-sided violence. From small events to large-scale incidents such as mass killing or genocide, most of these studies analyze the individual case and offer prescriptions for reconciliation and future prevention.
Anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists alike have provided case studies of civilian massacres ranging from Darfur to Cambodia to Peru. Very little research has been done on one-sided violence as a broader concept, one that envelops smaller-scale civilian killings by armed groups. Even fewer papers have been written utilizing aggregate data of any sort (Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay 2004; Eck, Sollenberg & Wallensteen 2003) .
Many references to one-sided violence are made in passing, categorizing the events among the normal side-effects of warfare. However, since Raphael Lemkin coined the term "genocide" in 1944, a vein of academic research has trickled forward in the studies of onesided violence. Rather than observing such events as the solitary actions of extremists or small bands of revolutionary guerrillas, increased awareness resulted in further attention being brought to these rare occurrences, with the objective of better understanding their causes and consequences. This has allowed for the creation of a new dataset concerning incidents and fatalities of one-sided violence, used in this thesis (Kavalyas 1999; Lemkin 1944 ).
Defining One-sided Violence
I define one-sided violence as the deliberate aggression by whole or representative part, of an armed, organized body against unarmed civilians, which results in death tolls amounting to 25 or more. To be clear: I am examining one-sided violence as an unintended signal. There may be any number of functions performed by one-sided violence, and there may be any number of other mechanisms that operate to establish a relationship between onesided violence and foreign aid inflows. For the purposes of this thesis I will specifically draw theory that examines one-sided violence in the role of a signal. Using this understanding to study one-sided violence, I rely heavily on the perceived incentives for donor states. By this I mean that the international community responds to the unintended signaling of a domestic disturbance in the recipient state, an assumption I will discuss later in this thesis. The purpose of these incidents and their subsequent social outcomes, while significant to understanding one-sided violence, are not the focus of this paper: I aim to address what the international community may interpret from these events, and gauge how potential donor states may then react.
In the analysis of the data, I seek an accurate representation of the donor states' perspectives of these events. (Starn 1995) ," was indicative of his intentions throughout the duration of the Sendero 1 Although I do not confine this study to one-sided violence in war, it is important to note that of the incidents between 1989 and 2010 as recorded by the UCDP, less than 1% were found to have occurred in states that were not experiencing conflict at that time (Eck & Hultman 2007) . 2 Extrajudicial killings are excluded from the UCDP dataset.
Luminoso's peak years as a powerful force within Peru. Within the UCDP-documented years, the Sendero Luminoso were responsible for approximately 714 deaths (Kruetz 2007) .
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Practical
As previously stated, I define one-sided violence to include all mass killings by (a) representative(s) of a governing or organized body, wherein unarmed civilian casualties amount to 25 or more. While the Sendero Luminoso were not an organized group from day one (or throughout), the actions of its members are coded as representative of the whole. As per the parameters set forth by the UCDP, this manner of operationalization is consistent.
One-sided violence is analyzed across two different measures. First is by the number of incidents in a given state, to examine if more incidents in a state causes a change the immediate aid flows. According to the theory, this is the most accurate measure of one-sided violence as a signal, as these individual incidents per year allow for an understanding of the effect of the individual events, rather than the overall casualty rates. The second means of measurement is by the estimate of fatalities per country year. This is based upon the UCDP fatality lists, which determines a low, high and best estimate of fatalities caused by direct and deliberate acts of one-sided violence 4 . Given the difference in coding for these measures, I
choose to focus on count of incidents per country year as my primary independent variable.
Within the parameters of this thesis, I seek to understand the potential reactions to signaling in the international community. Towards this end, one-sided violence is being studied as the signal of a recipient in need to the international community. Understanding the methodology within the data is important in order to understand better why these events may be providing such a signal, as the rarity, repetition, and region of event may aid in public awareness surrounding one-sided violence. Within these events, there is a contrast between aggressors and unarmed civilians. There are not two armed forces attempting to settle a dispute through violent means. In these cases, the outcome may be almost predetermined by the use of weapons to commit violence. It is the exceptional nature of this dynamic that may draw the international eye to such events, to be interpreted as a signal of need (Kalyvas 1999; Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay 2004) . To this end, I theorize that one-sided violence provides a measure of signaling based on domestic discord.
Limitations in Operationalization
In practice, the UCDP dataset has demonstrated limitations within its own definition. This dataset was collected via free and open source information. As such, the data are based largely on reports by journalists, witnesses, and human rights groups. This method of data collection results in limited information from "severely autocratic regimes," and events in detention facilities, and allows for a possible bias in fatalities offered by governments when pertaining to their domestic rebel groups (Sundberg 2009 ). In contrast to this limitation however, this method of collection is also extremely beneficial for this thesis, as my theory is largely dependent on the international awareness of such events, which is also based on this open source information. Therefore, the UCDP dataset provides a documentation of those events that have made it to domestic or international media outlets, which is an ideal situation for this study.
CHAPTER 3. OVERVIEW OF FOREIGN AID

Defining Foreign Aid
According to Following the receiving of such a signal, donor states may begin to seek out profit-gaining opportunities, and offer aid in order to obtain such benefts. The motivations behind giving aid are often viewed with severe criticism: colonial relationships, natural resources, trading partners and alliances are all examples of factors that may influence a donor's choice to give aid (and how much to allocate). It is these motivations that often take precedence over the welfare of the recipient when donors determine the allocation of aid.
Current Literature
Further evidence takes one step further in arguments for the import of donor interest over recipient needs. As the research of Alesina and Dollar (2000) indicates, the overall success of articulated aid goals have proven questionable at best. Much of the current literature on foreign aid critiques its effectiveness and the motivations within donor-recipient relationships. Empirical findings have largely concluded that aid efficacy is only maximized if such gifts are contingent upon the successful implementation of policy improvements that are predetermined within aid contracts. However, further research developed by Martens (2005) indicated that these aid contracts cannot be guaranteed without further investments.
The dynamic here shows that while aid programs may be launched successfully, they do not necessarily or even often achieve their intended purpose, resulting in an unreliable investment for donor-states (Collier 2000; Williamson 2009 ).
In practice, the answer to such unreliability in aid has been in the involvement of institutions; an attempt that has had minimal success at alleviating the concerns posed by aid donations. The concept is thus: if there exists an overarching body to stipulate the allocation of funds and execution of contracts, there should be an increased stability in aid donation.
Again, in practice this has been met with limited success. The works of various researchers indicate that many foils have emerged to degrade the positive effect of these organizations.
Failure to hold donors accountable, the political agendas of bureaucrats, and insufficient funding for program goals have been documented among the many weaknesses of these institutions (Crawford 1997; Kang & Meernik 2004; Martens 2005; Neumayer 2003; Williamson 2009 ).
This comprehensive documentation of missteps throughout the process of foreign aid donation brings to mind the question posed in the previous chapters: if these streams of aid have proven to offer minimal benefits to the recipient states, why do these streams continue?
I answer that donor states are non-altruistic entities as exemplified by the discussion of aid
effectiveness. Knowing what we do about aid effectiveness, if states were ultimately altruistic aid-givers, full implementation of aid goals would be pursued, and at the minimum, demonstrate some form of success. As the extensive research by Easterly (2000) , Alesnia & Dollar (2000) , and Balla & Reinhardt (2008) show, this is not the case. Therefore it is a logical conclusion that there must be continuing benefits to incentivize non-altruistic donor states into giving (and continuing to give) aid. Following further examination of the operations in foreign aid, I will discuss rent-seeking behaviors as an undermining mechanism in the donor-recipient relationship.
Forms of Foreign Aid and the Role of Institutions
Foreign aid has been offered under a variety of conditions that can be categorized under two sets of main titles: discretionary and concessional, and bilateral and multilateral. These first two main forms are indicative of the strings attached to foreign aid. Discretionary aid is granted with the understanding that its allocation is to be directed as the recipient dictates. In contrast, concessional aid applies contingencies on the aid programs, dictating that the funding be used for specific programs or sectors (Berthélemy 2006; Ram 2003; Williamson 2009 ) 5 . The next pairing, bilateral/multilateral aid, requires a more in-depth look. I will also discuss my decision to not separate these two forms in the models seen in Chapter 5, as official development assistance may encompass both, as coded by the World dataBank.
Bilateral aid (state to state) is the immediate transaction of aid from the donor to recipient, and the most direct form of the relationship in aid exchange. Such a donation will likely be dictated according to the pre-established norms between the two countries, and a close ally will be more likely to respond directly and substantively to a crisis within the borders of the recipient (Berthélemy 2006) . Multilateral aid involves the use of external institutions to allocate funds. These institutions act as third parties to alleviate worries of aid being used for manipulative or exploitative purposes. However, as Berthélemy (2006) 
Rent-Seeking
Entities are said to be rent-seeking when they actively attempt to manipulate the allocation of funds towards their own gain. This idea may be applied to benefits earned through political, social or economic gain. It is upon this idea that I build my theory of donor self-interests. At this point, it is important to note that though I am discussing donor selfinterests based on rent-seeking behavior, rent-seeking does not necessarily equate rentgaining. I do not assert achievement on the sides of the donor states; I merely state that there may exist an attempt to gain such benefits following the donation of aid.
Conjecture based on the self-interested donor does not require mental acrobatics. At this point I am providing a more precise label for an idea that has already been thoroughly articulated: the expectation that donor states are inherently self-interested in their aid-giving.
As such, I expect that the increase in aid flows may be due to the perception of increased incentives for donors. It is at this point that I turn to the theoretical foundation for this study, and offer a three-fold approach to better understanding the dynamic between one-sided violence and foreign aid flows.
CHAPTER 4. HYPOTHESIS & THEORY
Hypothesis
In a given country year, an increase in incidents of one-sided violence increase in foreign aid inflows.
Foreign aid research heavily emphasizes the requirement of the donor self-interest and recipient-need dynamic to achieve foreign aid: in order for the donor to give, the recipient Through backwards induction, if it is accepted that foreign aid is largely a political phenomenon, then it may be assumed that a gift of foreign aid would not be invested unless a minimum of political benefits would be assured. What Collier describes as "rent seeking predation" I apply to the relationship between one-sided violence and foreign aid (Collier 2000 (Collier , 2006 . States are not altruistic; while there is little to no expected financial return on foreign aid (even in cases of loans or concessions, return is not guaranteed), a donor state would be less likely to offer aid unless there are political or other tangible benefits to be realized. In this manner, I argue that one-sided violence opens the door for other nations to lobby for political power through foreign aid as they seek to increase the incentives for policy regulations in their favor, by the recipient state. It is not in the interest of the state to give away capital; however, it is in the interest of the state to offer aid in areas of the world where there may be a potential return for that donation.
Easterly discussed these roles of donor requirements (2006a), stating that approximately 75% of United States aid donations are "tied" to the requirement that the capital is to be spent on American products (Williamson, 2009 ). China has similar requirements stipulated in its aid contracts, as do many other aid donors. Such concessions often detract from the full value of aid in these recipient nations, as the restrictions restrain conservative spending. US food aid often requires a significant proportion of funds to be spent on transportation rather than food, in order to ensure the use of US produce. This is merely one example of how donor state interests take political precedence over the needs of recipient states. China provides an apt example of the expected trend discussed in this thesis. Though this description may seem severe, I argue that while China's activities may be more overt, they are certainly not unique. I do not aim to generalize from an individual case: on the contrary, I
use this example in order to demonstrate the factors of an expected dynamic that is argued in this thesis.
I expect that donor states always aim to maximize their payoffs, and altruistic donations to states in need are contrary to those aims. Subsequently, I expect that when donor states choose to give aid, they are in fact maximizing their payoffs, albeit with returns that may not be in the form of capital. With this speculation, I turn to the relationship between one-sided violence and foreign aid, as representative of the donor-recipient relationship.
In this thesis I test whether events of one-sided violence are followed by sudden increases in foreign aid inflows to those states that experience them. Conflict-ridden states offer opportunity for domestic and international rent-seeking, as even the perception of possible aid increased can alter domestic spending and productivity (Svensson 1999) . If my hypothesis holds true, I expect to see a surge in foreign aid following incidents of one-sided violence. In the next chapter, I outline the methodology and findings of these empirical tests.
CHAPTER 5. METHODOLOGY & DATA
Methodology
The data used for this thesis was extracted from Dr. Pippa Norris's Democracy Time- Religion was included to address the relationships found between states with similar demographics and/or shared histories. Alesina and Dollar (2000) found no significance between religion as a percentage of population (as a proxy for cultural affinity) for bilateral aid or FDI, but slight (negative) significance for select religions including Hindu, Animist and Atheist, when examined. This unexpected result in combination with conventional wisdom which often states that religion will play a part in aid flows, mandates its inclusion in this examination. Religions were coded as dummy variables across the following categories: Population is defined in terms of country's overall population, with a natural logarithm applied in order to account for change across the normal distribution. Colonial history was coded as a dummy variable, to account for the favoritism granted to such nations in terms of aid donations. Conflict was also included, incorporating all civil wars, that are a growing trend in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Civil wars were categorized based on internationalization, which involves the international intervention of military forces by other states, as well as internal, which confined aggression to the domestic armed forces.
Polity Index as coded by Jaggers, Gurr and Marshall (2010) , measures the authority patterns within state borders across the globe, on a scale of authoritarian (-10) to democratic (10), anchored in the patterns of the state regime. State structure is a fundamental element in both the onset and the outcome of one-sided violence. Autocracies are more inclined to be (or become) dictatorial and aggressive towards their own population, while democracies have been touted as the peace-seeking nations and therefore less conflict-prone. The latter assertion has been disproven across many studies due to the volatile transition required to achieve a stable democracy (Mansfield & Snyder 2002) . For this study, the polity index has been included to account for changes within its measures of democracy/autocracy.
Regime Durability as a measure is based on the polity index. This variable measures the most recent regime change within three years, or the completion of a transition signified by the lack of stable institutions. The variable examines the solidity of regimes in the short time period assessed by the amalgamative dataset used in this thesis.
Regime and Institutions were coded to determine the types of both, and examined to see the change in status over the indicated time segments. As these two components are often fundamental to the operations of the governments, I argue that fluctuations in their existence may be representative of domestic unrest and act on expectations of foreign aid.
The Physical Integrity Rights Index, according to the CIRI Human Rights Data Project is a combined variable, consisting of torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance indicators on a 0-10 scale (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999) . These manners of deaths are not coded into the UCDP dataset on one-sided violence, and controlling for their measures via an index is a reasonable measure of these effects. Further, this index is an acceptable proxy for civil unrest and government activity in the recipient nations.
Crisis State is a count of the number of government-based crises a recipient nation incurs in the years indicated. Using logic parallel to that which is seen in this theory, it is necessary to control for such incidents in case they too offer a signal to potential donor states for rentseeking opportunities. Institutions were also included as a dummy variable, as an institutional change could be a response to one-sided violence and act on foreign aid flows independently of the relationship measured.
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in constant 2000 US$ is measured by the World dataBank as GNI divided by midyear population. Regressions control for a differencing in this value, acting on allocation of foreign aid to recipient states. All continuous measures were transformed to adhere to the assumption of normality in regressions.
Data
For this study I ran a series of cross-sectional linear regressions with first-order autoregressive disturbances. Before turning to the regression outputs, I estimated a correlation matrix to estimate the possible relationships among the individual independent variables ( Table 2) . As presented below, there appear to be little significant correlations among the independent variables. The results of this matrix, which includes the entire dataset, conclude that few of the relationships are very strong, and those that appear to be significant are not unexpected, as the strongest observations are Latin America and Catholicism (0.908) and Regime type and Institutions (-0.861). Utilizing an extensive collection of cross-sectional time series regressions, I estimated a number of alternative models in order to investigate the proposed relationship between foreign aid and one-sided violence. The following tables presented are in 1, 3 and 5 year time segments, estimated as random-effects regressions with autoregressive (AR(1)) disturbances.
AR(1) disturbances were confirmed as being necessary following scatterplot analysis of the residuals, which indicated that the disturbances among the variables were correlated.
As I have previously indicated, thorough consideration of the theory presented in this paper warranted that the focus of this research be on the measurement of incidents per country year, rather than on the fatality estimates of one-sided violence. What will be presented in this section includes only those regressions estimated using this measure. In all regressions, the number of observations amounted to 528, with 90 countries included from the dataset. Though these findings are contrary to the presented theory, the lack of significance in the relationship is still informative. Conventional wisdom may often expect that the humanitarian element in one-sided violence may inspire some form of connection between aid flows and one-sided violence, which the presented models fail to confirm. Were these models failing to account for certain control variables, I would still expect to see a correlation, albeit weak, between the dependent and primary independent variable. Despite these findings, I do not abandon the presented theory, and offer the following limitations as possible explanations for the failure to confirm the hypothesis.
Limitations
The data collected have been has informative, and as one of the largest datasets with the widest variety of variables, was ideal for the purposes of this study. The lack of significant results could be the effect of omitted variable bias, which could be an outcome of the limited available data, and explained below. This opens an opportunity for future research with different datasets that may include variables not seen in the Democracy Time-series dataset, or with variables coded using alternate measures. However, due to the variety (and the sheer magnitude, at 705 variables) in this dataset, I maintain that this provided an excellent base from which to launch further studies.
With these limitations in mind, I understand that while there appears to be no significant relationship between one-sided violence and foreign aid in the models discussed above, the empirical data has much further to go before a relationship can be demonstrated, or classified as a relationship that has consistently provided no evidence for existence. As it stands, I perceive three main possibilities for why this outcome may exist.
First, as previously stated, it is possible that omitted variable bias plays a pivotal role in the insignificance of these results. Future research incorporating more datasets will be able to confirm or reject this postulation. Recommendations for additional variables include: exports, natural resources as a percentage of exports, oil as a percentage of exports, and size of allied nations. While the variables provided by the Democracy Time-series dataset provided a starting point for this theory, there are a variety of other models that may be run in order to confirm or deny confirmation of a relationship, the precision of which may be enhanced by including other datasets into the study.
Second, while the premise of the theoretical foundation may hold true, the role of the unintended signaling by one-sided violence could be missing a serious component: the interpretation of the signal by the donor state. As I have previously stated, the body of research on one-sided violence is in its infancy and largely categorizes one-sided violence as a byproduct of war. While it may indeed be true that one-sided violence does not occur as a random event, what this theory depends on is the role of the donor in perceiving such events as non-random. Without the transmission of this signal, donors may perceive one-sided violence to be no more than the typical expression of the violence in war. In such a case, I
would expect no change among the inflows of foreign aid.
Finally, while one-sided violence is a rarity, the use of aggregate data indicates that there is some acceptance and interest in the concept more than a mere byproduct. The possibility remains that one-sided violence, by and large, is considered more normal than I initially had theorized.
Future Research
The role of recipient signaling may have a place in international relations theory. Much of the current literature discusses the imbalanced power relationship between donors and recipients, but signaling may allow recipients to choose what needs or activities get broadcast to the international system. This research provides a starting point for those interested in studying the role of domestic crises in underdeveloped nations. Do these events have an effect? In studying onesided violence, I began to develop a better understanding of the implications of these matters for the states experiencing them. Though I failed to confirm my hypothesis, I maintain that the initial signaling function may still exist, and have provided a first step for future study.
There may be further insights gleaned from examining the nuances within these domestic crises, such as the societal roles played by the armed group (rebels, gangs, or governments for example). Though Svensson indicated that foreign aid does not discriminate in terms of corruption, the role of identity may be more powerful than what was originally believed.
Conclusions
In this thesis, I have argued that there is a direct relationship between one-sided violence and foreign aid. Further, I have utilized signaling as a means by which recipient needs are communicated to donor states, and discussed at length the pivotal role of donor self-interests in these events. While the findings from this study provided few conclusive answers, the results did suggest that incidents of one-sided violence might be followed with behaviors contrary to those that may typically be expected. Such events often inspire sympathy and the expectation of humanitarian intervention, but in practice the results demonstrate opposite behaviors. Foreign aid flows appear to pause following such events, which was an unexpected finding. This behavior may be explained by policymakers who temporarily discontinue aid until such a time when recipients' domestic affairs decrease their volatility.
The theory presented in this thesis discussed the relationship between one-sided violence and foreign aid flows, utilizing signaling as a basis to better understand a possible correlation. With the variables assessed, no conclusive results were uncovered, leading me to believe that the theory is incomplete. The contraction viewed in the one-year time segment did imply that there may be a measurable connection, but isolating a signaling mechanism may require the inclusion of other possible domestic crises in the dataset. 
APPENDIX
